Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the
European Union
Volume 2014 2014

Article 14

2014

Expectations and Reality: Opinion of the European Union in
Ukraine
Andrew J. Zahuranec
Mercyhurst College

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu
Part of the Eastern European Studies Commons, and the International Relations Commons

Recommended Citation
Zahuranec, Andrew J. (2014) "Expectations and Reality: Opinion of the European Union in Ukraine,"
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union: Vol. 2014, Article 14. DOI:
10.5642/urceu.201401.14
Available at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2014/iss1/14

This Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Current Jounrals at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union by an
authorized editor of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact
scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union

179

12
Expectations and Reality: Opinion of the
European Union in Ukraine
Andrew J. Zahuranec
Mercyhurst College

Abstract
The internet has had a profound impact on how political scientists understand social
movements. Using websites like Facebook and Twitter, demonstrators are able to share
and organize their ideas, to develop political strategies, and recruit supporters. Activists
communicate with one another and these messages can be analyzed to find patterns in how
social movements frame themselves in reaction to current events. In short, the internet has
an unprecedented capacity to show how political groups form. By examining posts on social media websites, this paper will assess the motivations of demonstrators involved in the
Euromaidan protests and determine the movement’s ultimate focus. The emphasis was not,
as many foreign outlets claimed, on the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement,
but on President Yanukovych’s general unpopularity. In this paper, I will discuss how an
anti-Yanukovych focus came to dominate Euromaidan using social framework theory, as
well as the role played by social media sites.
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Euromaidan is unique in how distinct its internal motivations are from external interpretations. While activists identified specific problems in Ukraine and developed a motivational framework to gain supporters, international media gave the movement different
connotations. As Western outlets showed videos of young Ukrainian students waving European Union flags, Euromaidan leaders, a diverse group of students, Tymoshenko supporters and nationalists, were working to remove Yanukovych from office. This discrepancy
reveals important information on how social movements form. Social movements are not
established or aimed toward outside interests, but domestic citizens. To understand why this
phenomenon occurred, it is necessary to study previous protest movements and their formation. Using social framework theory and social media, this paper will focus on how social
movements form. The internet is essential in tracking the development of political group
and is especially relevant in studying Euromaidan.
Social media represents a unique opportunity for researchers to track the development of political groups because it is unprompted, cheap, and constantly updated. When
compared to a versatile tool like surveys, several benefits are apparent. Although surveys
allow political scientists to gauge public opinion on a wide range of issues, information can
be skewed by circumstantial factors like phrasing and tone. A 1942 study conducted by the
Public Opinion Quarterly found that the interviewer had a strong impact on survey results.
Social media, by contrast, requires no interviewer (Katz, 1942). There is no solicitation and
no questionnaire to filter a respondent’s answers. Whatever information is reported through
social media is unlikely to be inaccurate and better represents the individual’s state of mind.
The lack of personnel also reduces the total cost of analysis. There is no need for interviewers so the amount of money spent on research is significantly reduced. Social media streamlines the data collection process. Finally, social media is constantly being updated. Rather
than being forced to reissue surveys every few months, individuals will continue to post
about world events so long as it remains within the public’s consciousness. During current
events, it is possible for sociologists to track the public’s reaction. Information is constantly
updated and there is little worry of information becoming outdated.
Social media serves an additional role in helping foment revolt. As discussed later in
this paper, social media played an essential role in organizing Arab Spring protestors and the
movement’s success was largely attributed to websites like Facebook and Twitter. In the
Syrian Civil War, both jihadist groups and secular rebel fighters have relied on Youtube to
communicate to domestic audiences and undermine the Assad regime’s credibility. Even in
the United States, social media has been used by political groups like Occupy Wall Street
and the Tea Party to attack the establishment. Ukraine is no different. Euromaidan protestors have taken to Facebook and blogs to attack the Yanukovych regime and organize resistance. Social media allows individuals with limited resources to connect with like-minded
individuals to affect change. Social media is a prominent political tool.
Since the internet’s inception, scholars, and policymakers have disagreed about its potential as a political and social tool. Some scholars, such as Manuel Castells, argue that social
networking offers great opportunities for political and creative action within society. Such
individuals state that “communication is the central power in contemporary society” and
that social media is a major influence in modern decision making (Fuchs, 2009). Others remain skeptical about “cyber activism,” pointing out that internet activity often fails to produce committed collective action. Social media constrains, rather than enhances, individual
creativity and opens the user up to either corporate or government exploitation (Gladwell,
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2014/iss1/14
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2010). The internet’s relationship with thought and action is still not fully understood.
The debate over social media’s utility, however, has failed to explain why increased
internet activity accompanies periods of political change. Suspected election tampering in
Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election caused a surge in Twitter activity. The spike in activity was
so intense that the US State Department requested Twitter delay a scheduled maintenance
update which would have temporarily blocked traffic (Pleming, 2009). Khaled Koubaa,
President of the Internet Society in Tunisia, reported two million Facebook users on the
eve of Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation and attributed new media penetration to the
Jasmine Revolution’s success. “Social media was absolutely crucial,” Koubaa said, “three
months before Mohammed Bouazizi burned himself in Sidi Bouzid we had a similar case
in Monastir. But no one knew about it because it was not filmed. What made a difference
this time is that the images of Bouazizi were put on Facebook and everybody saw it” (Beaumont, 2011). Anti-Mubarak protesters built a sophisticated network of social media sites to
support their activities. As one activist tweeted: “We use Facebook to schedule the protests,
Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world” (Khondker, 2011)it nevertheless
played a critical role especially in light of the absence of an open media and a civil society.
The significance of the globalization of the new media is highlighted as it presents an interesting case of horizontal connectivity in social mobilization as well signaling a new trend in
the intersection of new media and conventional media such as television, radio, and mobile
phone. One of the contradictions of the present phase of globalization is that the state in
many contexts facilitated the promotion of new media due to economic compulsion, inadvertently facing the social and political consequences of the new media. Este artículo examina el papel de los nuevos medios en ‘la primavera árabe’ en la región del Medio Oriente y
Norte de África (MENA, por sus siglas en inglés. Social media’s role during the Arab Spring
convinced millions to become active online. In 2009, there were 800,000 Facebook users
in Egypt (Attia, Aziz, Friedman, & Elhusseiny, 2011). By 2013, over 16 million Egyptians
had Facebook profiles (Farid, 2013).
A similar phenomenon has been recorded in Ukraine. Following Victor Yanukovych’s
refusal to sign the EU Association Agreement, opposition leader Arseniy Yatsenyuk called
for protests in Kyiv’s Independence Square through his Twitter account (Yatsenyuk, November 21, 2013b). The following evening 2,000 people converged on the square in protest, and social media registration spiked. The main Euromaidan Facebook page, created
November 21, 2013, shows significant activity, including over 2,000 updates in Ukrainian.
Their content has been shared over 230,000 times and includes information on avoiding
police, maps of places to take shelter, and flyers to distribute around the city (Barberá &
Metzger, 2013). Although only 33.7 % of Ukrainian citizens are active internet users, opposition leaders have regularly updated their online profiles with news and political messages,
underscoring social media’s role as a vehicle for political action (International Telecommunications Union, 2012).
In Ukraine, and the world as a whole, new media has emerged as a multi-purpose tool
for political groups and organizations. Although its efficacy in motivating others to action is
in dispute, social media is undoubtedly viewed as important by activists. Social media allows
groups to communicate large amounts of information instantaneously. As early publishers
with total editorial control over their own content, activists can frame political crises in
terms that favor their own political ideals. Individuals shift their mindset to sustain the social
movement and attract new followers.
Expectations and Reality: Opinion of the European Union in Ukrain
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Unfortunately, these mindsets do not translate well abroad due to language and cultural barriers. Foreign audiences cannot directly access the same materials that influence
a movement’s domestic supporters. Instead, the foreign public’s perception of the social
movement is defined by its elites who have the resources to understand the issues being
discussed. The media elite serve as a filter, wittingly or unwittingly promoting their interests
to foreign audiences and influencing public perception. Because the media elite’s interest
often co-align with the country that they represent, the public is then more willing to support the state’s actions abroad. Foreign audiences view social movements from a geopolitical standpoint, rather than from the individualistic, self-defined framework created by the
domestic audience. In short, the news influences how foreign events are perceived while
local social media shows what is actually happening. Euromaidan is a valuable example of
this phenomenon and reminds the public that their political ideas are determined as much
by exclusion of information as by inclusion. Groups can only know what they are able to
access and by cutting off certain information sources, language barriers influence how events
are interpreted.
Social Media as a News Source
Throughout history, information has been a valuable resource controlled and monitored by the state. Improvements to telecommunications have shifted control of these information caches to the general public, affecting how individuals interpret the political
system. This exponentially increasing amount of information “induce[s] large numbers… to
interpret information in new, more sophisticated ways” (Alterman, 1998). This interaction
is furthered by social media, which encourages interaction with the greater international
community, open debates on previously taboo topics, support for previously obscure political leaders, and involvement with larger social groups. These forms of information shape
how groups interact with political systems.
The Arab Spring is the most prominent social movement that showcased social media’s
role as a source for news information. In countries where free press was not available, Arab
youth used the Internet as a tool for exchanging political ideas. Social media is very difficult
to censor because the state’s capabilities depend on the speed and ability of government
officials to track down subversive materials. Tunisians used Facebook to spread video of
Bouazizi’s self-immolation when the country’s media refused to cover the incident (Harb,
2011). During a media blackout, Libyans used social media to provide minute-by-minute
accounts of violence to domestic and international audiences. “I can call Benghazi or Tripoli
and obtain accurate information from people on the ground and then report it straight on
Twitter to thousands of people,” claimed the UK head of the Libyan Youth Movement
(Channel 4 News, 2012). After the Mubarak regime realized how its own protestors were
using social media to coordinate, exchange political ideas, and provide updates to outside
interest groups, it blocked Twitter, then Facebook, and disrupted mobile phone text-messaging services (Associated Press, 2011). Even though most Arabs did not have access to
social media, those with access spread its contents with flyers and word of mouth. Social
media was an effective tool for sharing real world information to large domestic audiences
and communicating that widespread dissatisfaction to other relevant parties.
Prior to the Euromaidan protests, public satisfaction in Ukraine was at an all-time low.
A poll conducted in September by the Gallup Organization and the International Republican Institute reported that 67 % of Ukrainians thought their country was heading in a negahttps://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2014/iss1/14
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tive direction. An additional 88 % said their household’s financial situation had worsened
over the last twelve months (International Republican Institute & The Gallup Organization,
2013). In early 2013, a US State Department poll showed 75 % of citizens were dissatisfied
with their country’s economic situation, with only 25 % believing that Ukraine was a real
democracy (Sharma & Serpe, 2013). This dissatisfaction seeped into online communities,
with anti-Yanukovych groups appearing on Facebook throughout 2011 and 2012. Following Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the EU Association Agreement, opposition leader Arseniy
Yatsenyuk created a Facebook group to coordinate protests against the government. 11.5
thousand people indicated that they would attend the event, with several hundred posting
to the page within the first week of its creation (Yatsenyuk, December 13, 2013). There
was actual debate on how to best address Ukraine’s problems through social media. Facebook proved to be an effective means for Ukrainians to discuss and debate modern political
events.
Since the beginning of the protests, social media has been used as a forum for protestors
across the country. Euromaidan’s main Facebook group has attracted 17,000 registered visitors and over 280,000 likes. There are posts with maps of places to get free tea and access to
warm space, advice on how to avoid provoking government forces, and general information
on gathering spaces. Over 50,000 comments were recorded between November 22, 2013
and December 4, 2013 (Barberá & Metzger, 2013). All of this content was posted in Ukrainian, which suggests that the information is intended for a local audience. Demonstrators are
interacting with this information through debate and real world action. Flyers posted online
have appeared on Kyiv’s city streets, parliamentary figures have responded to the demands of
the online community, and every Euromaidan post is shared hundreds of times. Much like
during the Arab Spring, social media sites have become a political platform for individuals
to spread their message and ideals to a large domestic audience. It has played an instrumental
role in defining and framing the Euromaidan movement.
Social Media as a Framing Tool
Framing theory is a collective term that refers to the relationship between perception and action. People always strive to make the most rational choices possible. Thus, if
individuals act based on self-interest, then they should react to the same data in the same
way (Kernochan, 2004). However, this behavior does not occur. People alter their decision
making based on circumstantial data. Individuals are more likely to support decisions framed
in positive terms than ones based in negative terms. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahnerman demonstrated this principle in psychology through their 1981 “Asian Disease” study.
Participants were more willing to “save 200 lives” of 600 than allow “400 people to die”
(Tversky & Kahnerman, 1981). Context matters.
Recent developments in social sciences have focused on the media’s use as a framing
tool in societies and political systems. How a political issue is presented affects the degree of
support it will have (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012) independent and social media using a unique
dataset of Arabic language content from newspapers and key social media posts collected
during the peak of protests. Semiofficial (governmental. If an issue can be articulated in an
easily understood framework, then it is more likely to gain support. Entman explains that
framing is essential in political problem solving because, “to frame is to select some aspects
of a perceived reality and make [it] more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as
to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or
Expectations and Reality: Opinion of the European Union in Ukrain
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treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993). Audiences often do
not have direct experience with the event and rely on the media’s account to make rational
decisions (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). The public relies on informed
groups to highlight important issues and then make decisions based upon those concerns.
The democratic nature of social media allows it to act as an effective framing tool for
domestic audiences. Each user acts as both a reporter and consumer, providing information
to their immediate followers and feedback to others. This information can then be shared if
it has social value, or ignored if it does not. The most frequently shared topics become part
of the global conversation. Important information is determined by the online community,
which then contributes to political socialization. Unlike most other political tools, however,
social media feeds directly into itself. The public produces reports, which influences public
perception, which produces future reports. In modern political conflicts, such as Euromaidan, social media framing allows users to identify their problem, identify an adversary,
and motivate others to pursue change.
Problem Identification
When creating a social movement, the first step is identifying a problem. Gamson
terms this element as an “injustice frame,” because in this step a problematic condition
ceases to be misfortune, but a malevolent act by the authorities. When the public perceives
an act by the government as unjust, both the government and its action lose legitimacy.
The political system ceases to be an immutable element and instead becomes susceptible to
change. Meanwhile, the victim of the unjust act is identified and the public amplifies their
victimization (Snow et al., 1986). People like to sympathize with unfortunate circumstances.
If a problem can be conceptualized, with both a hostile aggressor and innocent victim, then
people can be motivated into action. Public unhappiness is no longer an intangible force.
The Arab Spring protestors excelled at applying their problems to a larger political
context. Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya all experienced high inflation and unemployment in
throughout the early noughties. In Tunisia, unemployment jumped over 5 % in two years,
with social mobility becoming almost non-existent (Haouas, Sayre, & Yagoubi, 2012).
These factors made it difficult for low skill workers to function and aggregated society to
its breaking point. Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation had a political component, but he
had endured abuse by the police over several decades without threatening action. His main
grievance were high prices and he justified his burning on economic downturn. Police
brutality was just the trigger. “How do you expect me to make a living?” Bouazizi asked,
before dousing himself in gasoline and setting himself on fire (Simon, 2011). When social
media activists received footage of his death, it was not framed as a single act of suicide, but
the horrific consequence of governmental tyranny. As this paper has mentioned previously,
a similar self-immolation was ignored by the public because it was not filmed and could not
be framed in a greater political context. Social media exploited the video of Bouazizi’s death
to shift discussion. Bouazizi became a symbol, an icon for political reform in Tunisia. The
economic downturn was no longer an abstract concept, but the direct consequence of the
regime’s abuses of power. The government needed to be removed.
When Yanukovych refused to sign the EU Association Agreement, roughly the same
phenomenon occurred. In the midst of severe economic downturn, Ukrainian media identified the EU Association Agreement as the best way to address the country’s economic
problems (Eurofax-Ukraine, 2013). The deal intended to allow easier travel for Ukrainians
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2014/iss1/14
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into Europe and for free trade. This framework was accepted by a significant portion of
the public, as indicated by polls and social media postings conducted in the weeks leading
up to November. The problems were unemployment and poverty, which could be solved
through closer ties with the European Union. Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the agreement
seemed dangerous, if not outright criminal, when viewed from this framework. The AllUkrainian Union Party advocated immediate impeachment proceedings against the President (Yatsenyuk, November 21, 2013a). Protests began shortly thereafter.
The framework of the protests shifted gradually from closer ties with the European
Union to a larger domestic context, which attracted greater support. An attack on protestors in December was characterized as a symptom of Yanukovych’s corruption and desire
for power. Economic issues were coupled with corruption, with protestors using social
media to take pictures of the president’s lavish personal residence, a subject that had previously been ignored by Ukraine’s media. Confidential government documents, which exposed rampant corruption, were posted to social network sites by anonymous individuals
(Lokot, 2014). Support for the Euromaidan protests grew beyond its original base. Only
48 % believed the Agreement would benefit Ukraine, but 86 % of the country opposed
Yanukovych’s policies before the protests (“Ukraine, poll: Do you support the activity of
Viktor Yanukovych?,” 2013). With the opportunity to remove a corrupt unpopular leader,
the focus of Euromaidan changed. Ukraine’s problems could no longer be solved by just the
EU Association Agreement, but by the President’s impeachment (Kyiv Post, 2013). The
protests grew in size, attracting not just European-minded liberals who wanted closer ties
with Europe, but all of Yanukovych’s opposition. Liberals, Conservatives, New Right, and
Socialists appeared on the streets. Yanukovych was even forced to deal with dissent from
within his own party (BBC News, 2014). A shift in framing allowed the protests to gain
momentum.
Meanwhile, international observers characterize the protests differently to better fit
their interests, which changed the protest’s framework abroad. Every culture has assumptions about the world that influence how its citizens rationalize and interpret events. These
concepts tend not to translate well to foreign audiences. What appeals to a Ukrainian is
different than what appeals to a German or Russian. Further complicating the situation are
language barriers. Very few people can consume primary sources, like social media and government documents, to help form public opinion in their country. Instead, people rely on
their government and press to interpret and conceptualize events. These elites have vested
interests and often skew the framework to support these goals. An issue that undermines
the country’s position is portrayed negatively. The elite want to rally the public to support
their government’s action should the state choose to become involved. Consequently, Euromaidan’s purpose and meaning was interpreted differently by domestic audiences than in
the West and Russia.
Western media cling to the framework of the protests being a consequence of European Union expansion and Russian interference. Citing early demonstrations, European
media views the protests as an attempt by Ukrainians to increase ties with the West. Even
though polling shows Ukraine divided on whether to focus or Brussels, Russia is seen as the
instigator of the protest movement, with Yanukovych taking direct orders from Moscow
(Fishwick, 2014). Even before the Russian invasion of Crimea, observers accused Putin of
destabilizing Ukraine and personally encouraging the Ukrainian government’s response to
the protest movement (Kaylan, 2013). These attitudes allow European and American ofExpectations and Reality: Opinion of the European Union in Ukrain
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ficials to condemn Russia as a weak state trying to increase its power potential. From this
framework, European involvement is wholly justified as a counterbalance to Russian encroachment. Vladimir Putin is placed at the center of the injustice frame and held personally
responsible for Ukraine’s economic instability. Only by increasing ties with the West and
shunning Russia can Ukraine save itself. Western officials have the obligation to support the
protestors (euronews, 2013).
In contrast, Russian audiences view Euromaidan as the product of European interference. Russia does not want to lose its influence in Ukraine and has portrayed any event
that threatens the Federation’s dominance as malicious. Thus, when the EU Association
Agreement was proposed, the Russian press demonized the treaty as an attempt to exploit
Ukraine’s fragile economic situation by powerful Western interests (Shestakov, 2013). Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the treaty was then framed as a legitimate foreign policy decision (Shestakov, 2013). The Ukrainian President had rebuffed an obviously imperialistic
agreement in favor of closer ties with Russia. From this perspective, Euromaidan does not
seem logical, except as aggression against Russia’s interests. The protests broke out against
a Russian ally, whose election was supported primarily by ethnic Russian-Ukrainians. The
Russian media, acting in concert with the government, portrayed Euromaidan as an attack
against themselves by the West. The European Union was the problem, destabilizing the
country and interfering with Ukraine’s plans for economic recovery. The protestors were
deluded puppets or outright fascists who wanted to use the guise of European expansion as
a way to attack Russians in Ukraine. President Putin cultivated these images and used them
to justify intervention. By invading Crimea, Russia could solve the problem of possible oppression against ethnic Russians.
Motivational Framing
Although problem identification is required for a social movement to form, organizations can accomplish very little without the public’s support. The movement must resonate
with the public to encourage collective action and sustained participation. In her study of
the American Animal Rights Movement, Rachel Einwohner identified four major ways
in which social movements sustain themselves: Seeing the positive, thinking cumulatively,
celebrating victories, and claiming credit (Einwohner, 2002b). Despite obstacles, groups
cannot think they failed completely in achieving their goals. Instead, social movements
must see their progress as incremental. Any outcome is evidence of progress that should be
appreciated and claimed, no matter how small. Activists must be able to attribute their own
actions to improvements in public satisfaction (Klitschko, 2013). From the earliest days of
the Euromaidan protests, there is evidence of activists pursuing all of these goals.
Even though many activists express pessimism about the likelihood of success, none
see their role as completely pointless. Instead, activists are able to see some positive aspect of
their actions even if they are not immediately successful. Lowering expectations makes the
group more hopeful about their cause’s future and less susceptible to criticism. A negative
response is better than no response at all. Activists know that their concerns are at least being
heard, which prevents the group from being demoralized.
Beginning on November 30, 2013 and continuing until Yanukovych’s removal on
February 22, 2014, the police used brutal tactics to suppress Euromaidan. These efforts
were universally condemned, but some activists were proud of their wounds. “The price of
freedom of the press in Ukraine now thx to the system put in place by our current governhttps://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2014/iss1/14
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ment,” tweeted opposition leader Vitali Klitschko about attacks on journalists, arguing that
the attacks had diminished the government’s legitimacy (Tyahnybok, 2013). On the forced
dispersal from the Maidan on January 3, 2013, another leader wrote, “An hour ago over
thousands of… internal troops ousted our checkpoint… More than ten protesters injured
(mostly rassecheny). Left there [to] picket. Not giving up! Together to victory!” (Spivak,
2013). Even though the protesters were suffering and dying due to government action,
Euromaidan activists remained hopeful. Every attack gave the group a platform from which
they could spread their message. By resorting to violence, the activists said, the government
damaged its own credibility.
Throughout protest movements, there is an idea that no action is completely useless
and with continued advocacy activists shift the discourse. Even if they receive a negative
response from demonstrating, there is a sense by activists that at least “people are thinking
about the issues.” Societal problems are viewed as a multidimensional, multistep process.
A negative response is just the first step in achieving change. Every advance is a step closer
toward the group’s ultimate goals. If only one person is swayed by activists that is still one
more supporter who will help the group achieve their cause. Being able to identify progress
helps people stay involved.
These attitudes are common throughout the Euromaidan protests, but can be seen
especially well during its early phase. Activists accepted that their views were in the minority and that most Ukrainians viewed them as dangerous radicals. However, by assembling
peacefully and spreading their message, they could at least convince the world that they had
Ukraine’s best interests at heart. In response to a photos of Euromaidan activists carrying
brightly coloured signs and meeting with local journalists, one internet commenter posted:
“I can only say bravo to the participants of this action. Compassion and love will
save us. Anti-maidanists (incidentally also the majority of Ukrainians, albeit brainwashed)
think
that we are evil… eager to let blood flow. You can see the relief when they began
to look at us [for what we are]. Once again, bravo. The simple smile can achieve more
than any weapon” (Spivak, 2013).
The group identified a minor goal, improving Euromaidan’s public perception, and
felt its actions made progress made toward it. If their fellow Ukrainians could be convinced
of the movement’s peaceful nature, then they might also be convinced that Yanukovych
was corrupt. The group hoped to shift the discourse through small but purposeful steps.
Every Ukrainian recruited was one more person turned against Yanukovych and his regime.
The movement’s ability to identify sub-goals helped Euromaidan achieve success.
In addition, protest movements tend to celebrate any positive progress as a reward,
keeping participants relaxed and happy. Not every moment of every day is a struggle.
Instead, groups find ways break the monotony of protests, demonstrations, and advocacy.
The exact reward depends on the context and group. For some, the reward can be a gift,
like food or clothing. For others, the reward can be much more abstract. Mere recognition
is powerful. In her paper on the American Animal Rights Movement, Rachel Einwohner
describes an incident in which a letter to the organization, lauding their cause, was publicized to the entire office. The reading was meant with a huge round of applause and the
activists reported high satisfaction, even though their campaigns had not been successful
(Einwohner, 2002a). Celebratory events help groups reinforce their cause’s positive improvements.
The distant, less hectic nature of social media has allowed Euromaidan supporters to
Expectations and Reality: Opinion of the European Union in Ukrain

188

Andrew J. Zahuranec Mercyhurst College

celebrate each and every victory. As has already been stated, the group’s main Facebook
page has thousands of supporters from across Ukraine who maintain the site with progress
reports and news updates. All these submissions are very popular, but the page receives the
most activity when a public official or group extends their solidarity to those in the streets.
On December 13, 2013 Yanukovych broadcast a round table debate with himself and
student leaders to show that he was concerned with the public’s demands. When it was
revealed that the students were actually members of the youth wing of Yanukovych’s party,
young people were outraged. Students and faculty at Ukraine’s largest university, the National Pedagogical Dragomanov University, released a statement on Facebook the following
afternoon, announcing their support for the movement, citing both the movement’s bravery and Yanukovych’s atrocities. The post went viral almost immediately, with over 2,500
likes and nearly 700 shares (Euromaidan, 2013). Unlike other items on the page, which
focus on organizing and tactical maneuvers, the comments below this page are jubilant.
Supporters have posted “You Rock!” and “Here’s to you as student leaders!” (Euromaidan,
2013). The post shows that, after large accomplishments, Euromaidan is more excited than
focused on how it will use these new supporters. Maintaining morale is just as important as
protest strategies.
Last, the group sees itself as responsible for major improvements. Unlike seeing the
positive and viewing goals as incremental, the group will claim that their activities led to
real objective improvements. Activists understand that other factors were involved, but see
themselves as playing a major role in their cause’s success. No matter how small their actual
influence is, they claim credit. Internal attribution is important.
Unlike other social movements, it is difficult to determine what improvements Euromaidan will claim. The movement is still ongoing and current events, such as the Russian
invasion into Crimea, have forced the group to re-evaluate its priorities. Although most of
the social changes in Ukraine can be attributed to Euromaidan, whether these changes are
long lasting remain to be seen. Group leaders have not claimed to achieve long term goals
and there is no evidence to suggest that they will do so yet.
Conclusion
Both views about Euromaidan, that it is a pro-West or anti-Russian movement, are
incorrect. Although international media sources frame the conflict to fit their state’s foreign
policy interests, most Ukrainians view Euromaidan as an issue of domestic policy. Yanukovych is a much more powerful motivator than European Union expansion. People are
dissatisfied with the system as a whole and the refusal to sign the EU Association Agreement was just the trigger that allowed people to express their discontent. These attitudes
are reflected by social media outlets, which have allowed protestors to organize and define
themselves. As a news source and framing tool, the internet is almost unmatched in its capabilities.
Euromaidan is just the latest example of the complicated relationship between social
movements and social media. In 2009 Iran and 2011 Tunisia, social media played an instrumental role in spreading information to large domestic audiences. Although internet
activity does not necessarily translate into physical action, the technology does allow groups
to express their views without being constrained by professional media sources. They can
organize, debate, and influence others outside the realm of mainstream politics. The state
and business no longer have a monopoly on information. The politicization process is behttps://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2014/iss1/14
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coming much more democratic. The internet represents new potential for the field of political science.
References
Alterman, J. (1998). New Media, New Politics? The Washington Institute. Retrieved from
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/new-media-new-politics-from-satellite-television-to-the-internet-in-the-ara
Associated Press. (2011, January 28). When Egypt turned off the internet - Middle East Al Jazeera English. Al-Jazeera. Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/2011128796164380.html
Attia, A. M., Aziz, N., Friedman, B., & Elhusseiny, M. F. (2011). Commentary: The impact
of social networking tools on political change in Egypt’s “Revolution 2.0.” Electronic
Commerce Research and Applications, 10(4), 369–374. doi:10.1016/j.elerap.2011.05.003
Barberá, P., & Metzger, M. (2013). How Ukrainian protestors are using Twitter and Facebook. Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
monkey-cage/wp/2013/12/04/strategic-use-of-facebook-and-twitter-in-ukrainianprotests/
BBC News. (2014). Ukraine appoints interim president. BBC News. Retrieved March 27,
2014, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26312008
Beaumont, P. (2011, February 24). The truth about Twitter, Facebook and the uprisings in the Arab world. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2011/feb/25/twitter-facebook-uprisings-arab-libya
Channel 4 News. (2012). Arab revolt: social media and the people’s revolution. Channel
4 News. Retrieved from http://www.channel4.com/news/arab-revolt-social-mediaand-the-peoples-revolution
Einwohner, R. L. (2002). Motivational framing and efficacy maintenance: Animal rights activists’ use of four fortifying strategies. Sociological Quarterly, 43(4), 509–526. doi:http://
dx.doi.org/10.1525/tsq.2002.43.4.509
Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. Journal of
Communication, 43(4), 51–58. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x
Farid, D. Egypt has the largest number of Facebook users in the Arab world: report. (2013,
September 25). Daily News Egypt. Retrieved March 26, 2014, from http://www.
dailynewsegypt.com/2013/09/25/egypt-has-the-largest-number-of-facebook-usersin-the-arab-world-report/
Interfax-Ukraine. (2013, November 11). EU Commissioner Fule expects Rada to pass European integration bills on November 21. (2014). Interfax-Ukraine. Retrieved from
http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/175853.html
Euromaidan. (2013, December 13). Euromaidan Status Update. Facebook. Retrieved from
https://www.facebook.com/EuroMaydan/posts/533323296764012?stream_ref=10
euronews. (2013). EU’s Füle rues Ukraine’s “missed chance.” euronews. Retrieved from
http://www.euronews.com/2013/11/26/eu-s-fule-rues-ukraine-s-missed-chance/
Fishwick, C. (2014, March 4). “We were so naive and optimistic”: Ukraine Euromaidan
protesters tell us what’s changed for them. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/04/ukraine-crisis-protesters-kiev-euromaidanindependence-square
Fuchs, C. (2009). Some Reflections on Manuel Castells’ Book “Communication Power.”
Expectations and Reality: Opinion of the European Union in Ukrain

190

Andrew J. Zahuranec Mercyhurst College

tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable
Information Society, 7(1), 94–108.
Gladwell, M. (2010, October 4). Small Change. The New Yorker. Retrieved from http://www.
newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell?currentPage=all
Hamdy, N., & Gomaa, E. H. (2012). Framing the Egyptian Uprising in Arabic Language
Newspapers and Social Media. Journal of Communication, 62(2), 195–211. doi:10.1111/
j.1460-2466.2012.01637.x
Haouas, I., Sayre, E., & Yagoubi, M. (2012). Youth Unemployment in Tunisia: Characteristics and Policy Responses, 14. Retrieved from http://www.luc.edu/orgs/meea/
volume14/PDFS/Youth_employment_in_Tunisia.pdf
Harb, Z. (2011). Arab Revolutions and the Social Media Effect. M/C Journal, 14(2). Retrieved from http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/
view/364
International Republican Institute, & The Gallup Organization. (2013, July 17). IRI
Ukraine Survey: Economic Issues Remain Greatest Concern | International Republican Institute (IRI). International Republican Institute. Retrieved March 27, 2014, from
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/IRI_Ukraine_August-September_2013_Edited %20Poll.pdf
International Telecommunications Union. (2012). Percentage of Individuals using the Internet. United Nations Development Group. Retrieved from http://www.itu.int/
en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/statistics/2013/Individuals_Internet_2000-2012.xls
Katz, Daniel (1942). Do Interviewers Bias Poll Results? Public Opinion Quarterly 6(2):
248–268.
Kaylan, M. (2013). Why Is Nobody Saying The Obvious: Putin Destabilized Ukraine.
Forbes. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/melikkaylan/2014/01/23/goahead-say-it-putin-destabiliized-ukraine/
Kernochan, R. (2004, August 8). Media bias is to a large extent a distinct section of the
general agenda-setting literature. California State University Northridge. Retrieved from
http://www.csun.edu/~rk33883/Framing %20Theory %20Lecture %20Ubertopic.
htm
Khondker, H. H. (2011). Role of the New Media in the Arab Spring. Globalizations, 8(5),
675–679. doi:10.1080/14747731.2011.621287
Klitschko, W. [Klitschko]. (2013, December 25). The price of freedom of the press in
Ukraine now thx to the system put in place by our current government. pic.twitter.com/zvasoXWE6E. [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/Klitschko/status/415834237854429184
Kyiv Post. (2013, December 1). Kharkiv protesters demand Yanukovych impeachment,
government resignation. Kyiv Post. Retrieved March 27, 2014, from https://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/kharkiv-protesters-demand-yanukovych-impeachmentgovernment-resignation-332740.html
Lokot, T. (2014). Ukrainian journalists take regime’s corruption public with YanukovychLeaks. Retrieved from http://netprophet.tol.org/2014/03/03/ukrainian-journalists-take-regimes-corruption-public-with-yanukovychleaks/
Pleming, S. (2009, June 16). U.S. State Department speaks to Twitter over Iran. Reuters.
Washington. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/16/us-iranelection-twitter-usa-idUSWBT01137420090616
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2014/iss1/14

Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union

191

Sharma, R., & Serpe, L. (2013, March). PRE-ELECTION PUBLIC OPINION IN
UKRAINE 2012. USAID. Retrieved from http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Survey/2012/~/media/Files/Publications/Survey/2013/Ukraine
%202012
%20Survey %20Report %202013_Final3.pdf
Shestakov, Y. (2013, October 24). The first European warning. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. Retrieved March 27, 2014, from http://www.rg.ru/2013/10/23/ukraina-site.html
Simon, B. (2011, February 22). How a slap sparked Tunisia’s revolution. CBS News. Retrieved March 27, 2014, from http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-a-slap-sparkedtunisias-revolution-22-02-2011/
Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Jr., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. American Sociological
Review, 51(4), 464–481. doi:10.2307/2095581
Spivak, R. (2013, December 14). Euromaidan Welcomes Antimaidan. Facebook. Retrieved
March 27, 2014, from https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.533925046703
837.1073741862.523004674462541&type=1
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of
choice. Science, 211(4481), 453–458. doi:10.1126/science.7455683
Tyahnybok, O. (2013, December 9). Oleh Tyanybok Status Update. Facebook. Retrieved March 27, 2014, from https://www.facebook.com/oleh.tyahnybok/
posts/674383079249076?stream_ref=10
Ukraine, poll: Do you support the activity of Viktor Yanukovych? (2013, November). Razumkov Centre. Retrieved March 27, 2014, from http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/
poll.php?poll_id=90
Yatsenyuk, A. [Yatsenyuk]. (2013a, November 21). Зрив асоціації з ЄС - підстава для
імпічменту президента і відставки уряду! http://youtu.be/A9_sbG0cipQ Усі на
Євромайдан! http://on.fb.me/1axa0pu. [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.
com/Yatsenyuk_AP/status/403532116610142208
Yatsenyuk, A. [Yatsenyuk]. (2013b, November 21). Усі на #Євромайдан! Янукович не
розуміє іншої мови, окрім Майдану. Тож маємо показати, що влада - це МИ!
Приєднуйтеся http://on.fb.me/1axa0pu. [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.
com/Yatsenyuk_AP/status/403453433648148481
Yatsenyuk, A. (2013, December 13). Народне віче за європейську Україну. Facebook.
Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/events/501502656623561/

Expectations and Reality: Opinion of the European Union in Ukrain

